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Abstract
In this article we explore the right to refuse an unsafe assignment. We
argue that an effective right to refuse is a necessary condition for informed
consent to workplace hazards.
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In this article we explore the right to refuse an unsafe assignment. We
argue that an effective right to refuse is a necessary condition for in-
formed consent to workplace hazards. Noting that the right to refuse,
as well as any other rights that workers have by virtue of being work-
ers, is empty if one does not have a job, we go on to explore the claim
that a person has a right to a job. We conclude by observing that the
same considerations which support the claim that they have a right not
just to any job, however demeaning, meaningless, routine, or boring,
but to useful and challenging work.
The Burnside Foundry in South Chicago:
February 14: Six workers are sent home by the company for
refusing to work on the furnace floor, where pools of water up to
three inches deep have been collecting in tapping pits.
February 15: The six men return to work. They know that if
any of the 3200 degree molten metal being poured from the fur-
nace into a ladle were to make contact with the water on the floor,
a tremendous explosion would rock the foundry. The company says
that it will remove the water from the floor.
February 16: Molten steel is being poured from the furnace
into the ladle. The ladle jams. Two maintenance men, Steve
Mihalik and Lawrence Stiff, go to work on the jammed ladle.
Neither has any protective clothing, face shield, or flame retardant
equipment which the company is required to provide.
Suddenly the ladle unjams. The hot liquid metal spills over the
side. In the tapping pit below, the three inches of water there is
instantly turned into a mass of steam, expanding in volume more
than one thousand times. Massive energy is released, spraying hot
metal in all directions, and Mihalik, Stiff, and 18 other workers in
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the area suffer severe burns over their bodies.
The evening of February 16: Steve Mihalik dies
from. . .burns over 90 percent of his body.
February 25: Lawrence Stiff dies, and shortly afterwards fel-
low steelworkers Albert Chisholm, Jr. and Lewis O'Daniel also die.
Stiff, Chisholm and O'Daniel are black.
In the aftermath of the explosion at Burnside, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) officials conducted a
two-week investigation and then announced their findings. They
found that the company had not taken adequate precautions to pre-
vent the explosion of February 16th and levied a fine of $42,000
and ordered the company not to reopen for production until all vio-
lations are corrected.
David Marshall, secretary of the grievance committee of Local
1719, pointed out that the union has filed more than 50 grievances
in the past year on safety related problems, and that a year ago
two men were badly burned when the ladle overturned due to de-
fective bearings. Two years ago, Marshall added, a worker was de-
capitated at Burnside when a moving crane whose operator could
not see the man, swung it against him.
"The safety Committee has to have more power to deal with
the company at the shop level," said Marshall. "We should be able
to file charges, levy fines against the company when they violate
the safety of the men, and set a time limit of eight hours for the
company to correct unsafe working conditions, with the men being
paid their regular hourly rate of pay while they wait for the com-
pany to make the necessary changes."
James Balanoff, director of District 31, USWA, labeled the
deaths at Burnside "murder," and pledged that "if I do nothing
else, I am going to bring these companies into the 20th century."
Balanoff said there have been nine deaths in District 31 plants
in the past year, with eight of them in the South Chicago area.
Workers in the steel mills, coal mines and other industries are
demanding stronger contract clauses on safety and health; espe-
cially protection for workers who refuse to work under unsafe con-
ditions. In addition, many workers are asking why management of-
ficials who are responsible for overseeing the carrying out of safe
working conditions, should not be held liable when workers suffer
death or injury due to unsafe jobs. . . .[from an article by Herb
Kaye, Daily World, March 15, 1979]
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Steel
In addition to burns, explosions, and myriad other accidents, steel
foundry workers may be exposed to silica dust, carbon monoxide, resins
such as phenol formaldehyde, hydrocarbon, coal tar pitch, lead (for
leaded steel), galvanizing chemicals, noise and heat stress (Scott, 1974
41). Let us look briefly at the effects of a few of these hazards.
Silica dust causes silicosis, a scarring of the lungs which causes
them to become progressively inelastic, making it more and more diffi-
cult to breathe, and preventing passage of oxygen to the blood. The
scars may join together and form larger scars, which may occupy the
entire lung. This process, called progressive massive fibrosis, is often
accompanied by increased susceptibility to tuberculosis and other lung
infections. The heart, due to the strain of pumping blood through in-
elastic lungs, becomes enlarged and fails to pump effectively (Stellman
and Daum, 1973, 167-69).
According to Rachel Scott, "Three foundries in Muskegon, Michi-
gan, employing thirty-five hundred to four thousand men, have for
years produced about four hundred new cases of silicosis annually. Ten
percent of the entire workforce, in other words, was disabled every
year" (Scott, 1974, 41).
Carbon monoxide is a colorless and odorless gas so one can be
exposed with no way of knowing it. It attaches and binds itself chemi-
cally to hemoglobin, the blood component that normally carries oxygen
in the blood. If body tissues do not receive a constant supply of oxygen,
they stop functioning and die. The brain is most susceptible, and early
symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning are the results of brain mis-
function due to lack of oxygen. Acute symptoms: headache, then throb-
bing headache, reddening of the skin, dizziness, dimness of vision, nau-
sea, vomiting, and at higher concentrations, coma, suffocation, and
death. Long term, low dose effects: headaches, dizziness, decreased
hearing, visual distrubances, personality changes seizures, psychosis,
palpitations of the heart with abnormal rhythms, loss of appetite, nau-
sea and vomiting (Stellman and Daum, 1973, 164-65).
Coal tar pitch causes dermatitis accompanied *by pains, swelling,
rash, and blisters, skin cancer, including scrotal cancer, lung irritation,
and may occasionally cause pulmonary edema (Stellman and Daum,
1973, 193-94).
In the coke ovens powdered coal is converted into coke, a hard,
dense fuel that is used to charge the steel furnaces. This is the dirtiest
workplace in a foundry. Coke oven workers risk excessive exposure to
1984] 549
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coal tars. They develop cancer of the scrotum at a rate five times that
of the general population. They also develop cancers of the lung, blad-
der and kidneys at rates greater than the general population (Scott,
1974, 45). A study begun in 1962 and published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor in 1974 examined the health records of 100,000 steel-
workers at 17 plants. Among its findings were the following: Coke
workers as a group are two and one-half times more likely to die of
lung cancer than steelworkers who do not work in coke plants; after five
years on the job in the coke plant the lung cancer rate rises to three
and one-half times the normal rate; for workers on top of the coke bat-
teries with five years on the job, the death rate is ten times higher than
normal (Spencer, 1977, 224; Scott, 1974, 45-46).
Considering these facts, it is important to note that while the over-
all percentage of blacks in the workforce in basic steel is 22 percent, in
the coke oven area it is 90 percent. Of all black coke oven workers, 18
percent were in full-time topside jobs, compared to 3.4 percent of white
coke workers (Safer Times, July/August, 1978, 3).
Heat stress takes various forms, depending on the conditions of
exposure, degree of activity, and individual body response. There are
four types of acute reaction: heat stroke, heat exhaustion, heat shock,
and heat fatigue.
Heat stroke involves a sharp rise in body temperature accompa-
nied by confusion, angry behavior, delirium, and even convulsions. The
skin is warm and dry, and there is no sweating. It can be fatal.
In heat exhaustion, or heat fainting, the victim feels tired, giddy,
and nauseated, and may feel chilly. There may be rapid, shallow
breathing, a weak, slow pulse, and moist, clammy, cold, pale, or even
bluish skin. The blood pressure is low because the blood vessels all over
the body are dilated, and there is not enough blood to circulate through
these enlarged vessels.
Heat shock is a form of heat exhaustion common in healthy per-
sons working in a hot environment to which they have not become ac-
climatized. The body loses excessive amounts of fluid and/or salt due to
inefficient sweating. There may be insufficient fluid in the body to
maintain circulation to all organs. Lack of salt may result in heat
cramps, weakness, nausea, headache, fatigue, and dizziness. The victim
becomes irritable and suffers muscular weakness.
Heat fatigue is characterized by the lassitude, irritability, and
easy fatiguability that are familiar hot weather sensations. "A person
with heat fatigue does not work as well, produces less, makes more
mistakes, and has more accidents. The feelings get worse if the fatigue
[Vol. 8
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is not relieved by rest. Heat fatigue may affect a person's personal rela-
tions on the job and at home as well. Thus in addition to paying a
physical price for working in a hot environment, a worker will pay an
emotional price" (Stellman and Daum, 1973, 128).
Prolonged exposure to a hot environment results in a process called
acclimatization. The process takes from four to six days and is most
effective in young people; older people never acclimatize to heat com-
pletely. Changes occur in the circulatory system and in the volume and
composition of sweat. Dilation of the small blood vessels of the skin
allows the heat of the blood to be transferred through the skin back to
the environment. This increases the work load for the heart since blood
must be pumped through a larger total circulation area. To compensate
for this increased work load, the blood vessels to the liver, stomach, and
intestines constrict. The liver is sometimes damaged by lack of oxygen
resulting from prolonged active work in a hot environment (Stellman
and Daum, 1973, 123-28).
Discussion
Let us begin this discussion by picking up the thread of an issue
that links the first three chapters and, less directly, the fourth as well.
In the first chapter we raised the question whether the Cyanamid case
could be called a case of sterilization without informed consent, due to
lack of genuine consent. In the second chapter we raised the same
question concerning the Oxy case, this time due to lack of information.
We went on to explore the more general right of informed consent to
risks and hazards one is exposed to on the job, and its implications for
the right to know. In this chapter we shall look at the implications of
the right of informed consent to risks or hazards on the job for the
issue of the right of workers to refuse an unsafe work assignment.
It is not clear from the report of the Burnside Foundry case
whether any of the workers who were sent home on February 14th for
refusing their assignments were among those killed or injured on the
16th. It seems likely that some of them were the same, but that is not
really important. What is important is whether the workers had a right
to refuse to be subjected to a risk of what they believed to be a high
probability of serious injury or death, and if so, what the bases of that
right are, and what the right entails.
Workers have been dismissed (and told they had quit), fired for
insubordination, suspended without pay, sent home without pay for the
remainder of a shift and told not to return until ready to do the job,
1984]
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had disciplinary letters placed in their files (which can later be used to
justify firing, not promoting, etc., on the grounds that a person is unco-
operative or a troublemaker)-all for refusing assignments they be-
lieved to be unsafe. The arguments to justify these responses on the
part of employers seem to be one or more of the following:
1. The employee accepted the job. This is part of the job. Therefore,
the employee should do this or (a) be considered to have quit, or
(b) be fired for insubordination for refusing to do the job he or she
was hired to do.1
2. If workers are permitted to refuse assignments, plant discipline will
break down and chaos will ensue. Therefore, workers who refuse
must be let go or otherwise disciplined.
3. To pay workers who have refused an assignment on the grounds
that they consider it unsafe would be to pay them for not working
rather than for working, and surely that no employer is bound to
do.
4. If workers had the right to be paid in such circumstances, that
would be tantamount to a right to strike with pay, and surely work-
ers do not have that right.
In the first argument, the assumption seems to be that in accepting
a job a person agrees to carry out any assignment falling within that
job, so to refuse an assignment is a breach of the employment contract.
There are at least two possible responses to this argument.
The first response is to deny that the unsafe assignment is part of
the job. An assignment that poses a serious threat to life, health, or
safety cannot be said to fall within the definition of any job except for
those where extreme risks are expressly understood in advance. Even
so, this is a matter of degree. Coal miners daily face risks most workers
do not face simply by entering the mines. But if a tunnel ceiling has
not been properly inspected and repaired, the fact that they have
agreed to the risk of working underground cannot be used to argue that
they breach that agreement if they refuse to enter a shaft that does not
meet legally required-or other reasonable-safety standards.2 A stunt
1. In either case (a) or (b), if the employer's version is accepted, the worker is
precluded from collecting unemployment insurance in many states. One cannot collect
in most states if one quits voluntarily or is fired "for cause."
2. It is neither necessary nor sufficient that a legal safety standard be violated
before a worker may be justified in refusing an unsafe assignment. A violation may not
be serious and may pose no immediate danger, hence, the assignment is not unsafe in
[Vol. 8
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person agrees to accept risks that other actors are not expected, and
would rightfully refuse, to face. But if a stunt person regards a particu-
lar stunt as poorly designed, or believes crucial safety equipment to be
defective, he or she can rightfully say that those risks are not part of
the job. According to this response, a crucial premise of the first argu-
ment is denied.
The second response does not deny that the assignment in question
is part of the job. It points out that the employer has the legal and
moral and often contractual obligation to provide a safe and healthy
work environment. So it is the employer, not the employee, who has
breached the employment agreement or contract.' Still, many collective
bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures, and a worker who
alleges that the employer is in violation of the contract is normally ex-
pected to file a grievance and proceed with his or her assigned work.4
This approach is obviously inadequate in the case of a serious and im-
mediate threat to life, health, or safety. Thus it is the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat that supports the right to refuse. Such refusal
is not itself a breach of the employment agreement, however; rather it
is a response-the only adequate response available-to a breach by
the employer.
Either way, there is no justification for claiming that, by refusing
an unsafe assignment an employee either breaches the employment
agreement or is insubordinate.5 It cannot be that, in accepting a job,
one consents to all risks and hazards that may be encountered in that
job. To be meaningful, the right of informed consent must apply at two
the requisite sense. So violation is not sufficient for justified refusal. On the other hand,
there may be no specific standard covering a particular hazard which nevertheless
poses a serious and immediate threat. In such a case, I claim, refusal is justified; so
violation is not a necessary condition for justified refusal. So far, I am not talking about
the legal status of the right to refuse; we shall come to that later.
3. Even if there is no written contract, or no explicit mention of health and safety
in an existing contract, presumably fulfilling one's legal obligations as an employer may
be understood as implicit in any employment agreement.
4. Unless the union agrees in the contract to give it up, workers do have the right
to strike over contract violations. But we are talking now about an individual or several
individuals refusing a particular assignment, not about a strike.
5. Insubordination is generally accepted as, and is explicitly recognized in many
union contracts, as grounds for dismissal. (In most contracts, management has the
right to fire for just cause, and in many 'just cause' is spelled out as including insubor-
dination.) This reflects the traditional view that strict plant discipline is an important
employer prerogative. It is revealing that failure to be subordinate should be grounds
for voiding what purports to be a voluntary contract among equals.
1984]
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levels. Before accepting a job and while remaining in it, one has the
right to the information needed for informed consent to the risks that
the job entails. One must also have the right to refuse a particular as-
signment one believes to constitute a serious and immediate threat to
one's life, health or safety. And note that the right to know is an indis-
pensable part of the right of informed consent at both levels. Both the
right of informed consent and the right to a safe job are, in practical
terms, empty if the price of refusing an unsafe assignment may be
one's job. Indeed, these rights, along with all other rights of workers,
are relatively empty in the absence of an effective right to a job. This is
so in several ways, as we shall see below.
We have, I believe, disposed of the first of the employer arguments
against the right to refuse. But what of the second argument, that if
workers are permitted to refuse assignments, plant discipline will break
down and chaos will result? We might look at the experience else-
where, for example in Canada, where legislation passed in seven prov-
inces during the 1970's guarantees the right to refuse:
Fears by management that health and safety issues would be
exaggerated out of proportion or used to further other collective
bargaining goals have not been borne out. In 1500 cases of work
refusal in Saskatchewan, all cases were considered to be legitimate
by Saskatchewan authorities. Experience has also shown that the
increased worker participation in making actual operational deci-
sions on health and safety has reduced potential for industrial con-
flict, in addition to raising awareness about about safety.[NJCOSH
Newsletter, May 1979, 1]
In Saskatchewan, the right to refuse is held by individual workers,
though groups of individual workers can exercise it together. The
worker or any member of the legally mandated union-management
health and safety committee can call in an inspector to arbitrate if
there is a dispute. (According to provincial officials, that occurs in
fewer than five percent of the cases.) The inspector is required to
render a decision as soon as possible, usually within twenty-four hours.
If an employer feels that the worker did not have "reasonable grounds"
to believe the situation was "unusually dangerous," the employer must
prove it before disciplinary action can be taken. The employee must
receive normal pay and benefits until the issue is settled. Even so, Jen-
nie Smyth of the provincial safety division reports,"The right to refuse
has been underused rather than overused. There have been many situa-
tions we hear of later in which people should have refused but were
554 [Vol. 8
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afraid to" (Witt and Early, 1980, 25).
Workers in Sweden also have a strong right to refuse. Individual
workers have the right to refuse dangerous work, and the government
mandated safety committee (more than half of whose members must
be elected by nonsupervisory employees) can shut down unsafe opera-
tions.' They can be overruled only by a government inspector. Even if
overruled, no worker can be punished for exercising the right to refuse
unsafe work or stop an unsafe operation unless the action was taken in
bad faith. Swedish central labor confederation attorneys report that
they know of not a single case in which a worker has been prosecuted
for deliberate abuse of these rights. Since the right of safety commit-
tees to stop dangerous work went into effect in 1974, use of it has re-
sulted in the intervention of government inspectors only about twenty-
five times per year in the country's 160,000 workplaces (Witt and
Early, 1980, 25).
Considering that the right to refuse is vital to the effectiveness of
the right to a safe job and to the right of informed consent to job
hazards, the case against the right to refuse would have to be very
strong indeed to justify its denial. That some unjustified refusals might
occur would certainly not be sufficient reason. Yet there seems to be no
reason to assume that workers would abuse the right to refuse, and
experience where the right has been in effect for some years argues
against the assumption. Thus the second employer argument fails.
The third argument is not directed against the right to refuse it-
self, but against the obligation of employers to pay workers who have
refused an assignment on the grounds that it is unsafe. One potential
buttress for this argument, that paying workers who have refused
would lead to massive abuse of the right to refuse, is not plausible in
light of the Canadian and Swedish experiences. Thus the argument
must rest on the claim that it would be an injustice to the employer to
require that a worker be paid after refusing an assignment, for this
would require the employer to pay the worker for not working.
Many union contracts in the United States actually provide for the
6. These committees also have the following rights: to veto any plans for new
machines, materials, or work processes for health and safety reasons; to decide how to
spend the company health and safety budget; to approve the selection and direct the
work of the company doctor, nurse, safety engineer, or industrial hygienist; to review
all corporate medical records, monitoring results, and other information on hazards;
and to decide how much time they need to do their safety committee work, all of which
must be paid for by the company (Witt and Early, 1980, 22).
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right of a worker to refuse an unsafe assignment, but do not guarantee
that the worker will not sacrifice his or her earnings by doing so.' The
result is that the right is seldom invoked. In the course of discussing
one case in which it was successfully invoked at a Republic steel plant,
Charles Spencer writes:
Article Twelve reads: "If an employee shall believe there ex-
ists an unsafe condition. . .so that the Employee is in danger of
injury. . .the Employee shall have the right. . .to be relieved from
duty on the job in respect to which he has complained and to re-
turn to such job when the unsafe condition shall be remedied." It's
not as simple as it reads. It's a bewildering and uncoordinated pro-
cedure that can be disastrous to any worker who invokes it. In the
thirty years it has been a part of the union contract, it has never
[until this occasion] been successful in correcting a single unsafe
working condition-which accounts for the shift towards depen-
dence on federal government intervention. Almost identical provi-
sions are written into all union contracts, and the experience has
been much the same.
Requesting to be relieved from duty until an unsafe condition shall
be remedied runs into such hurdles as (a) Is there really an unsafe
condition? who says so? (2) What's to happen to the workers "relieved
from duty" if there's no other work available? They can't be paid for
staying home. (3) Who shall decide if the unsafe condition has actually
been remedied? (4) What happens to the other workers who aren't
complaining and are willing to continue on the job?
There had been numerous instances at this plant where workers
who invoked Article Twelve and requested to be relieved from duty on
the job until an unsafe condition is remedied were "furloughed" for
several weeks, during which they were not paid a penny and in the
meantime other workers were assigned to and performed the same job.
If the newly assigned workers had refused, they, too, could have been
disciplined, even discharged. Although Article Twelve provides for the
Company to reassign workers to another job when they invoke Article
Twelve, it is the usual contention of the Company that no other job is
available. (Spencer, 1977, 213-14).
7. This is true for large international unions such as the Steelworkers
(U.S.W.A.), but many smaller unions have only recently begun to get any safety provi-
sions at all into their contracts. (Even if all union contracts did have such provisions,
that would cover only about 20 percent of the U.S. workforce.)
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Another more subtle way in which workers are discouraged from
exercising the right to refuse is explained in Rachel Scott's report of an
interview with Ken Bellett, a steelworker at Bethlehem's Lackawanna
plant:
The men themselves sometimes "forsake safety," he said, to
make production. "Most workers are on some kind of incentive pro-
gram. Every department has a different kind of incentive. Foremen
are also on incentive and top management have a bonus system.
Under contract terms, a man can refuse to do the job because it's
unsafe. The guy will holler but then go ahead and do it. Otherwise,
he's going to lose money that day. It's going to affect his earnings.
If it means shutting down a whole department, the other guys will
shoot you." The result is that often rather than shutting machinery
down for repairs, maintenance workers have to work"while it is op-
erating. [Scott, 1974, 57-58]
Recall that two days prior to the fatal explosion at the Burnside
foundry six workers were sent home for refusing to work near the pools
of water in the tapping pits. Six workers lost their pay for the remain-
der of a shift, the unsafe condition was not corrected, and four workers
lost their lives. Workers generally cannot afford to continue to refuse
until a job is made safe. In part this is because, as long as it is the
worker who is bearing the cost, if the employer can keep the operation
going without the worker in question, the employer need be in no hurry
at all to correct the unsafe situation. And a worker whose refusal would
result in the shutting down of an operation faces not only his or her loss
of earnings, but that of his or her co-workers as well. So the employer
can rest assured that this will rarely happen.
In view of these considerations, it seems clear that the right to
refuse an unsafe assignment cannot be effective unless (a) the worker's
normal pay is continued after the refusal, (b) some person or group
representing the workers, such as a safety steward or safety committee
has the power to shut down an unsafe operation with no loss of pay to
the affected workers, and (c) incentive programs such as those de-
scribed by Bellett are eliminated or somehow revised so that workers
are not constantly forced to make a trade-off between safety and earn-
ings. Condition (c) appears be be necessary both directly, and as a nec-
essary condition for (a) and (b).
A worker can, of course, complain to OSHA to get an unsafe situ-
ation corrected, but there are several reasons why this is no substitute
for a strong and effective right to refuse. First, although OSHA at-
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tempts to inspect within twenty-four hours situations in which the area
director determines that there is a reasonable basis for the claim of
"imminent danger," there is always some delay. The potential length of
delay has been greatly increased by the Supreme Court's 1978 Barlow
decision ruling that an employer may require an OSHA inspector to
obtain a search warrant before entering the premises. If the worker
stands to lose pay during that time, he or she is still in the position of
choosing between economic loss which the worker may not be able to
afford and doing the unsafe job for some period of time until an inspec-
tor arrives. If the inspector finds an imminent danger, he or she asks
the employer voluntarily to abate the hazard and remove endangered
employees from the area. If the employer refuses, OSHA, through the
regional solicitor, applies to the nearest Federal District Court for ap-
propriate legal action. Thus the potential for substantial delay is clearly
present.
In addition, OSHA gives top priority only to inspecting situations
where the area director determines that there is reasonable basis for
the claim of "imminent danger." An "imminent danger" is defined in
Section 13(a) of the OSH Act as "any condition where there is reason-
able certainty that a danger exists that can be expected to cause death
or serious physical harm immediately or before the danger can be elim-
inated through normal enforcement procedures" (Nothstein, 1981, 295-
96). A "serious violation," which is not top, but third priority for in-
spection, exists under Section 17(k) "if there is a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result. .. "
(Nothstein, 1981, 347). There are obvious difficulties in distinguishing
in practice between an imminent danger and serious violation, so de-
fined. A boiler about to explode is an imminent danger, but a boiler
dangerously in need of repair could explode now or could rumble along
for another six months or more. That it was about to explode is, I
would guess, in the vast majority of cases, known only after the fact.
Moreover, there are other problems about what constitutes an immi-
nent danger. Health hazards, for example, are imminent dangers under
the Act if there is a reasonable expectation that toxic substances or
dangerous fumes, dusts, or gases are present and that exposure to them
will cause irreversible harm to such a degree as to shorten life or cause
reduction in physical or mental efficiency, even though the resulting
harm is not immediately apparent (Nothstein, 1981, 296). Yet when
the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union claimed
that pools of mercury on the floor of an Allied Chemical factory repre-
sented an imminent danger, and showed that at least twenty-five work-
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ers in the area had symptoms (tingling in hands and feet, tremors, irri-
tability, drowsiness, loss of memory, and sore gums) or chemical
evidence of mercury poisoning, the Department of Labor ruled that
"imminent danger" applied only when there was a "risk of sudden
great physical harm. . .like a boiler explosion" (Stellman and Daum,
1973, 12).8
For these reasons, and because it seems to me that "substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result" can be
sufficient to warrant refusal, I believe that a worker's right to refuse
cannot be limited to imminent danger situations. It must apply also to
serious violations and to serious hazards that are not violations of spe-
cific OSHA (or other relevant) standards. But in the case of a serious
violation, not only will there be a longer delay before an inspection, the
employer will normally be given some period of time (possibly days,
possibly months) in which to correct the violation while continuing in
operation. An employer can then appeal any aspect of the citation, ar-
guing, for example, that the situation is not a violation at all, or that it
cannot be corrected in the time allotted. This can drag the process out
still further. Or an employer can simply fail to correct the violation, the
fine that may result usually being much less than the cost of correction.
Now one response to all this is that OSHA's enforcement system
should be strengthened. There should be more compliance officers, and
8. Stellman and Daum report on the effects of mercury as follows:
. . .Whenever it is left open to the atmosphere, mercury vapor will be
present.
Mercury is stored mainly in the kidneys, but its most striking effects
are on the nervous system. A person with mercury poisoning can develop a
slight tremor of the hands and no longer be able to write properly. Before
that, there may be emotional problems such as anxiety, indecision, embar-
rassment, and depression, and also excessive blushing and sweating. Mer-
cury poisoning can lead to speech disorders and loss of coordination. The
victim may develop a staggering gait. Serious changes in mental ability
and personality may occurt. The expression 'mad as a hatter' refers to the
fact that most hatters used to become crazy after practicing their profes-
sion over the years. The mercury they used to soften the felt in the hats
poisoned them and eventually drove them mad.
Mercury also affects the vision and the eye reflexes. It particularly
affects the mouth and teeth, causing loose teeth and sore gums. The kid-
neys may also be damaged.
These serious and often irreversible effects make it imperative to pre-
vent all exposure to mercury vapor and other forms of mercury. . . [pp.
255-56]
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they should have, and use, greater enforcement powers, especially in
the case of imminent dangers and serious violations. This is certainly
true.9 But such enforcement should be a complement to an effective
right to refuse.
It is worth noting in this connection that there had been an OSHA
inspection several months before the fatal explosion at the Burnside
foundry. Workers had pointed out to the inspector the pools of water in
the tapping pit. The water was not cited as a violation in the inspection
report (CACOSH Health & Safety News, Vol. 6, no. 8, 1). Yet, after
the explosion, OSHA officials conducted a two-week investigation and
among the violations cited were these:
-Workers were required to work with and transfer molten
steel and slag from furnaces to ladles where the material could con-
tact water and wet surfaces.
-Water was allowed to seep into the tapping pits by improper
maintenance of ground water draining systems and ineffective seal-
ing of pit sides and bottom.
-During the weeks preceding February 16th, the furnace tap-
ping pits were not cleaned, thus allowing water pockets to occur
and increase the amount of water which would not be pumped out.
-The company did not provide adequate personal protective
equipment to prevent exposure of maintenance workers to the
hazards of burns.
-Repairs to a defective ladle tilting mechanism were at-
tempted while the ladle was suspended over the tapping pit. [Kaye,
1979, 22]
The company was ordered not to reopen until all the violations were
corrected.
One point this illustrates is that in many ways the workers them-
selves are the real experts concerning health and safety problems and
hazards in their workplaces. They are there all day, day after day, year
9. In 1980, OSHA had enough inspectors to inspect each workplace once every
eighty years; average fines were less than $60 per violation, and standards to control
the tens of thousands of toxic substances were being issued at the average rate of fewer
than three per year (Witt and Early, 1980, 21). These figures can be expected to drop
drastically during the Reagan administration.
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after year. They see, hear about, and experience directly the accidents,
near misses, headaches, sore throats, difficulty breathing, and the rest.
Providing workers with whatever technical training is necessary, and
empowering them to enforce their right to a safe and healthy work-
place by means of an effective right to refuse an unsafe assignment,
and to shut down an unsafe operation, is thus an eminently sensible
approach to workplace health and safety. It cannot work, however, if it
is not backed up by government intervention and enforcement in dis-
puted cases. A strengthened OSHA enforcement system is needed as a
complement. This would be a primarily preventive approach in two
senses. It would be more likely to prevent injuries, deaths, and illnesses
than a system which can only respond more slowly and often after the
fact. In addition, the more effective the power to shut down an unsafe
operation, the less likely workers would be to have to use it in order to
get hazards corrected.
To illustrate, let us look again at the Swedish experience:
The degree of incentive for managers to reach agreement with
workers on health and safety issues depends, of course, on the rem-
edies available to workers. ...
Since the right of safety committees to stop dangerous work
was established in Sweden in 1974, use of it has required the inter-
vention of government inspectors only about twenty-five times per
year in the country's 160,000 workplaces. All parties interviewed
agreed that this low figure was mainly a reflection of the effective-
ness of the threat of using that power, and not a reflection of work-
ers' reluctance to use it or of ignorance of their rights.
According to Bo Feldt, chief union safety committee member
at the 12,000-worker Volvo plant at Goteborg:
We have over 200 safety stewards in the plant and
their strength is in their ability to go to the foremen and
say, "Do that or I stop the job." The foremen usually do
it-whatever it is. If the men stop work, even if the gov-
ernment comes in and says work should continue, they
can't be punished. But our experience has been that
most of the stops have been correct stops. [Witt and
Early, 1980, 25]
As we have seen, all of the incentives presently at work in our
system seem to weigh against the employee exercising the right to re-
fuse, and against the employer responding by correcting the condition
promptly when the right is exercised. The requirement that employees
be paid in the event of a refusal or a shutdown of unsafe work should
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help to shift that balance, removing a strong disincentive to workers'
exercising the right to refuse, and providing an incentive for the em-
ployer to act promptly to correct the condition so as to prevent or end a
shutdown.
But, it may be objected, if there really is no other available work
to assign the workers, would it not be unjust to require the employer to
pay them? If it is unjust, then even if it would probably have desirable
consequences, it may not be justifiable. The objection has not been
satisfied.
My response is that it is not unjust. A worker is hired to do a job
and shows up prepared to do it. He or she has a right to a safe environ-
ment in which to do the job. If that is not provided, the employer has
failed to fulfill the employment agreement, as I argued in response to
the first employer argument. What would be unjust would be for the
worker, who has fulfilled his or her side of the agreement, to be forced
to bear the financial loss resulting from the employer's failure to do the
same.
Now it will be objected that I am assuming that the worker's
claim that the assignment is unsafe is true, but often that is just what
is at issue.
It seems to me that the worker must be given the benefit of the
doubt in this situation. For one thing, it is his or her life that is at stake
if the condition really is unsafe. The right of self-determination re-
quires that a decision so importantly affecting his or her life be made
by the individual. Moreover, the right to refuse could not be effective if
the worker stood the chance of losing pay, or even his or her job, be-
cause the situation is later found not to have been unsafe. The worker
might, of course, be right and still be "found" wrong. Or the worker
may be wrong but have had good reason to believe the situation unsafe.
So long as a worker believes in good faith that doing the work assigned
would seriously threaten his or her life, health, or safety, the worker
has, I claim, the right to refuse until the assignment is shown to be
safe.
There may, of course, be occasions where a worker sincerely be-
lieves an assignment to be unsafe but does not have what other in-
formed persons would regard as good reasons for that belief. I want to
claim that the right to refuse without punishment or loss of earnings
applies in such a case through an inspection and appeal process such as
that outlined below. The distinction between good faith belief and good
reason for the belief is implicitly recognized by not claiming for every
individual worker the right to shut down an operation he or she believes
562 [Vol. 8
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to be unsafe. The individual worker has the right to refuse for him or
herself, and to have a trained safety steward or committee with the
power to shut the operation down. Obviously, there may be difficulties
in determining that an individual's belief is sincere in the absence of
what informed and reasonable others regard as good reason for the be-
lief. Nevertheless, I am sure that there could be cases in which the
belief was obviously sincere, though ill founded. Partly because of this
indeterminacy, the burden should be on the employer to show that a
refusal or stoppage was not in good faith.
None of this would be an undue burden on the employer if the
issues could be resolved quickly. The Canadian and Swedish laws pro-
vide a model for how this can be accomplished. We need (a) prompt
inspection and resolution of any disputed refusal or shutdown situation
(within twenty-four hours, say); (b) an accelerated appeals process
available to both employer and workers (another twenty-four hours);
(e) workers' pay and benefits continue as usual; (d) workers not subject
to penalty for being wrong., but only for acting in bad faith; and (e)
any penalty to be imposed only after the employer has demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the appropriate reviewing body that the refusal or
shutdown was not in good faith.
That such a system is not unworkable seems amply demonstrated
by the fact that some like it are in operation elsewhere. That it would
require the commitment of additional resources to health and safety
administration is probably true. But again, the experiences in Canada
and Sweden do not suggest that such a system would result in an un-
manageable flood of refusals. Some such system seems a necessary con-
dition for an effective right to refuse an unsafe assignment, which in
turn is a necessary condition for satisfaction of the right to a safe job
and the right of informed consent to job hazards.
What of the employer argument that the right to be paid after
refusing an assignment would be tantamount to a right to strike with
pay?
The right to strike is the right to engage, with one's co-workers, in
the concerted action of withholding one's labor in an attempt to achieve
some common goal. The withholding of labor here is an economic tool
or weapon used in an attempt to wring some concession from the em-
ployer, or force the employer to honor some right of the employees on
pain of loss of income resulting from halted operations. This right is
guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
commonly called the Wagner Act.
Section 502 of the Wagner Act states: "Nor shall the quitting of
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labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally
dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such em-
ployee or employees be deemed a strike." This distinction seems to me
well-founded. In the case of refusing an unsafe assignment or shutting
down an unsafe operation, workers are not using their refusal in an
attempt to get the employer to honor their right to a safe job (though
one may hope that it will have this effect). They are simply exercising
their right to a safe job, which they cannot do, under the circum-
stances, without withholding their labor. The right to a safe and health-
ful workplace includes the right not to be exposed to unreasonable risks
to life or health. So, in the same way that one exercises one's right not
to incriminate oneself by refusing to answer questions one would other-
wise be obliged to answer, one can exercise one's right to a safe and
healthful workplace by refusing work assignments that involve unrea-
sonable risks to life or health-assignments one would otherwise be
obliged, under the employment contract, to accept. The withholding of
labor is not used as an instrument or weapon at all in such a case. The
purpose of such a refusal is not to bring economic pressure to bear on
the employer; it is simply to avoid exposure to unreasonable risk.
Thus we must distinguish between refusing an unsafe assignment
and shutting down an unsafe operation on the one hand, and striking
(including striking over health and safety issues) on the other. A strike
over health and safety issues might occur in an effort to get strong
health and safety provisions in a contract, or to enforce existing legal or
contractual health or safety provisions that are being violated, where
the violation does not present a serious and immediate threat to life,
safety, or health. Workers might strike to obtain access to information
needed for a research or educational project on health and safety. Fi-
nally, workers may have shut down an operation they deemed unsafe,
and gone through a process such as that outlined above, with inspec-
tion, ruling, appeal and final ruling. This much, I claim, they have the
right to do without loss of pay, and this much does not constitute a
strike. If now, they are dissatisfied with the final ruling and want to try
to get the employer to make the repairs or changes they deem neces-
sary for a safe operation, they may strike in an effort to achieve this.
I have argued that workers have a moral right to refuse an unsafe
assignment and to have an individual or committee representing work-
ers empowered to shut down an unsafe operation, and they have a right
to these things without loss of pay. I have attempted to counter em-
ployer arguments against the right to refuse and against the right to be
paid after refusing. I shall now report, briefly and without comment,
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the current legal status in the United States of the right to refuse.
In 1973, the Department of Labor issued Interpretive Rule
1977.12(b)(2) which states that under the OSH Act an employee may
refuse an assignment if the employee's apprehension is
of such nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances
then confronting the employee, would have concluded that there is
a real danger of death or serious injury and there is insufficient
time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger
through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.
The regulation prohibits employer discrimination against workers who
exercise this right.
Employers continued to take action against workers who refused
assignments on safety grounds, and challenged the regulation in result-
ing court cases. They argued that when Congress passed the OSH Act
it rejected a provision which would have authorized workers to refuse
unsafe assignments without loss of pay, and that the regulation would
grant workers the right to strike with pay. They warned that the right
to refuse would foster disharmony in the workplace, invite continuous
labor unrest, and even industrial combat. Lower courts had ruled in
conflicting ways on various cases involving the right to refuse, so the
legal status of the right was in limbo until February 26, 1980.
On that day the Supreme Court ruled on a case stemming from a
July 10, 1974 refusal of two maintenance workers employed by Whirl-
pool to climb onto a guard screen suspended twenty feet above the
work area. Several workers had been injured in falls through the
screen, and two weeks before the refusal another worker had fallen to
his death. OSHA had ordered the screen repaired, but no repairs had
been made. When the men refused, they were sent home for the re-
maining six hours of their shift and letters of reprimand were placed in
their files.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the interpretive regula-
tion, saying that it "clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of
the Act-to prevent occupational death and serious injuries." "It would
seem anomalous," wrote Associate Justice Potter Stewart, "to construe
an act so directed and constructed as prohibiting an employee, with no
other reasonable alternative, the freedom to withdraw from a work-
place environment that he reasonably believes is highly dangerous."
The letters of reprimand were ordered withdrawn as they violated the
prohibition against discriminatory action. The Court declined to rule on
the issue of the six hours' pay the two men lost, saying that issue was
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"not before the court." The pay issue was sent back to district court to
be reheard in the light of the Supreme Court's ruling."0
There is, as far as I know, no legal provision for workers, whether
individual workers, safety stewards, or committees, to shut down an
unsafe operation, though some union contracts may contain such provi-
sions. The original version of the "imminent danger" clause of the
OSH Act allowed compliance officers to close down an operation in
which an imminent danger was found. But the final version requires
that, if the employer will not shut down voluntarily, OSHA must go to
federal court.
Let me close this part of the discussion by trying to pull together
what we now can say about the notion of informed consent. It probably
is not possible to specify sufficient conditions for informed consent ei-
ther in general or in relation to specific sorts of risks or activities such
as workplace hazards, participation in scientific experiments, undergo-
ing surgery, and so on. There are too many different kinds of factors
which could be present in individual circumstances and which could
undermine the adequacy of information or the genuineness of consent.
One could not hope to think of all such possible factors and deal with
them in advance. But, if what has been said on the subject in this and
the preceding chapters is correct, we can say what several necessary
conditions are for informed consent to job-related hazards or risks:
1. The offer to the potential or actual employee that he or she may
accept or keep the job must not be a coercive offer. (There may be
different accounts of what constitutes a coercive offer, as we noted
in Chapter One, but that the offer must not be coercive for consent
to be genuine should not be controversial.)
2. The employee must not be unnecessarily unfree to a high degree,
as that notion is sketched out in Chapter One, with respect to the
choice of whether or not to accept or keep the job. (This claim is
more likely to be controversial.)
3. The right to know must be satisfied in at least all four of the as-
pects discussed in Chapter Two. (Another aspect of the right to
know will be proposed below.)
4. The right to refuse an assignment believed by the worker to present
a serious and immediate threat to life or health must be effective.
10. This account of the case and ruling is compiled from the following sources:
In These Times, March 12-25, 1980; Home News, February 27, 1980; LOHP Monitor,
Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 1980; Daily World, February 28, 1980.
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This requires that the workers not be subject to discipline, loss of
job or earnings, and that a person or group in the workplace, repre-
senting workers, be empowered to shut down an unsafe operation
without loss of pay to the affected workers.
Two additional candidates for inclusion are the right to advance
notice of, and the right to veto or require changes in proposed new
machinery, materials and work procedures for health and safety rea-
sons. These rights are held by the Swedish joint safety committees
mentioned above, which must have a majority of their members elected
by the non-supervisory employees. These rights are clearly related to
informed consent, but it might be argued that they go somewhat be-
yond the notion of informed consent into the more general area of self-
determination, that is, participation in decisions which importantly af-
fect one's life. In defense of the claim that they do come under in-
formed consent, it might be pointed out that, without these rights, new
machinery, materials, and processes often are introduced into the work-
place with little or no prior notice, so that workers have no opportunity
to explore, in advance of using them, what the risks and hazards might
be. Hence, they cannot be said to have been accorded the right of in-
formed consent with respect to these new factors introduced into the
work environment. Moreover, once the new equipment or process is in
place it may be impossible-it will certainly be more difficult and ex-
pensive-to make appropriate changes or choose a safer alternative. I
would, therefore, claim that the right to advance notice is clearly a
necessary condition of informed consent. The right to veto or require
changes in plans might go beyond informed consent, but only on the
assumption, or to the degree, that conditions (1) and (2) on the above
list are satisfied. Indeed, I would add that the worker must not be un-
free to a high degree, whether or not that lack of freedom was
necessary.
Remaining in a job after a new hazard has been introduced can be
said to constitute consent to that hazard only if a worker is free to quit.
The fewer alternatives available to a worker, for whatever reasons, the
less free that worker is to quit. The less free the worker is to quit, the
more is the right to veto or require modifications in proposed new
processes or materials a necessary condition for consent.
I said above that the right of informed consent and the right to a
safe job, along with all other rights of workers, are relatively empty in
the absence of an effective right to a job. Let us now explore some of
the ways in which this is so.
First, the rights to informed consent and to a safe job have no
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application in the case of a worker who cannot get a job at all.
Second, the right to a safe job, or any other right, is empty in the
absence of effective guarantees against reprisals resulting from the ex-
ercise or attempted enforcement of the right. Employers are prohibited
from discriminating against employees for exercising the rights guaran-
teed them under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and under
the National Labor Relations Act. But workers know that employers
can and often do cite other reasons for a dismissal or other disciplinary
action, and there is no way to be sure one will get a favorable ruling if
one contests the action. Most important, the employer's position
prevails unless and until it is overturned by the relevant authority. And
such a process will take months at a minimum, more likely years. The
employer has every incentive for dragging the case out in the hopes
that the worker will become discouraged and drop it. Meanwhile the
worker is without any means of support, and all benefits such as health
insurance are cut off. The prospect of back pay in the event of a
favorable ruling, especially since one cannot count on it, is no help in
paying rent and buying food. Thus the threat of dismissal is an ex-
tremely powerful deterrent to a worker's exercising any rights against
the employer's wishes, despite legal "safeguards." Reversing the bur-
den of proof, so to speak, in dismissal and other discipline cases could
go a long way toward alleviating this problem (and would, in effect,
acknowledge that workers have a right to due process in disciplinary
matters generally, and property rights in their jobs which may not be
set aside without due process)."1
In general, a strong union is much more effective at ensuring that
workers may exercise their legal, as well as their contractual, rights
than the courts or government agencies. The latter are useful, even es-
sential, to a union's efforts in many cases, but they often are not very
useful to the individual without union representation. This is so in part
because of the problems of burden of proof and delay mentioned above,
in part because, if the individual still has his or her job, filing a com-
plaint is likely to bring further reprisals, including possible dismissal, in
11. In West Germany, the Protection Against Dismissals Act, passed in 1969,
bars the "socially unjustified" dismissal of any worker after a probationary period of
six months. The law is enforced by labor courts whose effectiveness originally was un-
dermined by long administrative delays (up to five and six years in some cases). Now
the unions can veto any individual discharge for "cause," and the worker stays on the
job until the labor court decides. Cases are settled much more promptly now (Eco-
nomic Dislocation, 23-24).
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part because the individual is unlikely to have access to the kind of
experienced legal advice and assistance needed to see the effort through
successfully, and finally because the personal, emotional, as well as
financial, cost of pursuing such a matter on one's own can be
unendurable. Thus, effective rights relating to unionization are fre-
quently necessary conditions in practice for the enforcement and exer-
cise of even those rights provided by law for all workers whether or not
they are union members. It is no wonder, therefore, that rights relating
to unionization are among those rights the exercise of which is most
likely to result in reprisals, as we shall see in the next chapter.
A third way in which the right to a job can be a necessary condi-
tion for the enforcement and exercise of other rights is that, in addition
to individual workers facing the threat of dismissal or other disciplinary
action, an entire workforce may face the threat of a shutdown or run-
away shop. Getting OSHA, or other agencies at local, state, or federal
levels, to set and enforce strong standards for the protection of the
health and safety, or other rights, of workers is no victory for those
workers whose employers' response is to pick up and move to a city,
state, or country with weaker regulations, or none at all. Just like the
individual worker who faces the threat of dismissal for refusing an un-
safe assignment, workers who face the implicit or explicit threat of a
shutdown or runaway shop in response to health and safety demands
confront the choice: risk your life and health or your job.12 This is not
an idle threat. Between 1969 and 1976, fifteen million jobs were lost as
a result of plant shutdowns. (DeCarvalho, et. aL, 1981, 1). And, of
course, the difficulties of an individual worker who loses his or her job
are multiplied by much more than just the number of workers affected
by a whole plant closing. The prospects of finding another job in the
area are far worse. An entire community can be devastated by the clos-
ing of a major plant.
I do not deny, by the way, that small and economically marginal
businesses may sometimes be forced to close by even relatively small
increases in costs. The Small Business Administration does make low
interest loans to help small businesses finance costs of compliance with
health and safety regulations. More should be done along these lines. It
should not fall on the workers to sacrifice their health and safety to
12. Employers are prohibited from threatening to shut down or move in order to
discourage unionization or to influence contract negotiations. They are not prohibited
from warning of or predicting a potential shutdown or move. For employees, the pros-
pect is threatening either way.
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save their jobs. These small and marginal businesses are not the main
problem in the current wave of shutdowns and runaways, however. Ac-
cording to MIT economist Bennett Harrision, "Globetrotting corpora-
tions will close profit-making plants if they aren't profitable enough,
and if they can make more elsewhere." He notes that Sperry Rand
closed a plant in Herkimer, New York because it wasn't making a 22
percent return-on-investment. Large conglomerates make money by
buying out an independent company, "milking" the profits out of it,
and then shutting it down. Then they get federal and state tax breaks
for investing in new equipment and relocating. A study of the New
England economy by Harrision and a colleague revealed that 100,000
businesses closed in New England between 1969 and 1976, costing a
million jobs. Big corporations account directly for 15 percent of the
shutdowns and over half of the job losses. But, in addition, many of the
small independent businesses that close down do so in the wake of cor-
porate shutdowns rippling through their communities (Dreier, 1980,
18).
Even a strong and militant union is largely defenseless against this
threat, given the current legal situation in the United States. Our laws
generally protect a company's right unilaterally to make all "invest-
ment" decisions. Yet this right is increasingly being questioned in view
of the effects of such decisions on the lives of so many others. When the
United Steelworkers of America filed suit to block a plant closing in
Youngstown, Ohio, the court said:
This Court has spent many hours searching for a way to cut to
the heart of the economic reality-that obsolescence and market
forces demand the close of the Mahoning Valley plants, and yet the
lives of 3500 workers and their families and the supporting
Youngstown community cannot be dismissed as inconsequential.
United States Steel should not be permitted to leave the Youngs-
town area devastated after drawing from the lifeblood of the com-
munity for so many years.
Unfortunately, the mechanism to reach this ideal settlement,
to recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the
code of laws of our nation. At this moment, proposals for legislative
redress of economic relocation like the situation before us are pend-
ing on Capitol Hill. Perhaps labor unions, now more aware of the
importance of this problem, will begin to bargain for relocation ad-
justment funds and mechanisms and will make such measures part
of the written labor contract. However, this Court is not a legisla-
tive body and cannot make laws where none exist--only those rem-
edies prescribed in the statutes or by virtue of precedent of prior
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case law can be given cognizance. In these terms this Court can
determine no legal basis for the finding of a property right.13
The court here clearly recognizes the existence of a moral right of
workers to their jobs. The right referred to here is a kind of property
right, acquired, presumably, by working at a particular job. Legal rec-
ognition and protection of this right is a necessary condition for the
protection of other worker rights. As the existence of this right becomes
more widely recognized, there will no doubt be much controversy over
precisely what it amounts to. I shall not attempt to resolve that ques-
tion here. It may be useful, however, in thinking about the question, to
see how some other countries are handling it, and what some proposed
legislation in the United States looks like.
Sweden, West Germany, and the United Kingdom all have na-
tional legislation regulating plant closings and reductions in force (lay-
offs). Typically, corporations are legally required to give advance notice
to the national employment service, the union or works council, and the
individual employees likely to be affected before closing a plant or dis-
missing workers for economic reasons. The amount of notice varies
among the countries, and depending on the number of workers affected
and the body being notified. Before implementing such a decision (and
in some cases, before finalizing it), the company must negotiate with
the employees' union or the plant's works council concerning possible
alternative plans as well as the timing, distribution, and compensation
above the statutory minimum for any layoffs that do take place. If no
agreement can be reached, the matter goes to arbitration. Workers are
entitled to time off with pay to look for new jobs, and for retraining in
addition to severance pay, the minimum amount of which is established
by statute and is pegged to the amount of time the worker has been
employed by the company. In some cases the combination of notice and
negotiation results in an alternative to the proposed closing or cutback
being found. Often, the process is stretched out sufficiently so that a
planned reduction is handled by attrition and no dismissals are neces-
sary. When workers do lose their jobs, the proportion of income re-
placement provided by statutory unemployment benefits in the three
countries is far higher than in the United States, payments to their
Social Security accounts are continued on their behalf, and medical
coverage, provided by the national health care system, continues. Inter-
13. Steelworkers, Local 1130 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 103 LRMM
2925, 2931 (N.D. Ohio 1980). Quoted in DeCarvalho, et al. 1981, 1-2.
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estingly, the United States is the only industrialized country besides
South Africa without national health insurance. 4
The National Employment Priorities Act was introduced in the
United States Congress in 1979. If enacted it would require advance
notification by companies planning to close or relocate plants. The
amount of notice varies from six months to two years, depending on the
number of employees to be affected. A National Employment Priorities
Administration would be created within the Department of Labor. The
Administration would investigate any proposed closing or transfer and
recommend ways to avoid the closing or to minimize its impact on em-
ployees and the community. Employees would have the right to transfer
to another facility of the same company at the same rate of pay. All
relocation and retraining costs would be paid by the company or the
federal government. If transfers were not available, the employer would
be required to pay affected workers severance pay amounting to 85 per-
cent of their average wage minus unemployment compensation for up
to 52 weeks. Retraining programs would be provided for affected work-
ers. Workers over the age of fifty would have the right to retire on
reduced benefits. Pension and health insurance payments for all af-
fected workers would be guaranteed for one year. The affected commu-
nity would receive a mandatory one-time payment of 85 percent of the
resulting annual tax loss.
Less comprehensive bills have been introduced in several state leg-
islatures, including those of Ohio, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Il-
linois. Clearly, federal legislation would be preferable, as states and
municipalities often end up competing with each other, to the detri-
ment of all of them, by offering concessions to businesses, such as tax
abatement schemes, lax environmental standards, anti-union "right to
work" laws, and a generally "favorable climate for business," in order
to attract companies (and hence jobs) or persuade them not to leave.15
14. Information in this paragraph is from Economic Dislocation, Joint Report of
Study Tour Participants, 1979, UAW, USWA, IAM.
15. Under section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, states may enact laws prohibit-
ing the negotiation of union security clauses in union contracts. A union security clause
provides that all employees within the bargaining unit must join the union after the
probationary period for newly hired workers, usually thirty to ninety days. This makes
it much easier for employers to break a union by hiring anti-union employees who, by
both example and argument convince others to become "free-riders." Many southern
states have such laws, resulting in the lowest percentages of unionized workers in the
country and the lowest wages in the country-promoting opponents of these laws to
call them "right-to-work-for-less" laws. (See Chapter Four for further discussion.)
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The textile industry, for example, has virtually deserted New England,
relocating either in the "Sunbelt," where few workers are unionized
and wages are the lowest in the country, or in "developing" countries
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philipines. In these countries,
repressive regimes friendly to U.S. business guarantee low wages, a
well-disciplined workforce, and few or no health and safety or environ-
ment regulations. Indeed, the lure of these countries, where daily wages
correspond to hourly wages in the United States, is so great that even
the "Sunbelt" is losing some eighty jobs due to plant closings for every
one hundred jobs created there (Economic Notes, Vol. 48, No. 5).
Thus it is necessary that workers' rights be nationally and indeed inter-
nationally, guaranteed and protected if workers are not to be faced con-
stantly with the threat that enforcing and exercising their rights as
workers may cost them their very jobs.
Another approach to the protection of workers' rights to their jobs
in the face of plant closings is to guarantee them and/or their commu-
nity the right to buy out or take over the closed plant and run it them-
selves. This often would not be feasible, however, even if corporate co-
operation and access to initial capital were available. One reason for
this is that, as we saw above, corporations, especially conglomerates,
often run a plant into the ground, failing to reinvest profits in necessary
maintenance and modernization, siphoning them off into more profita-
ble investments instead. So the doctrine that the owners of a business
concern have the sole right to make decisions concerning the invest-
ment of profits from that business permits a company to let a plant
deteriorate, while extracting profits from its operation, and then to
abandon the plant-along with the employees and the community that
have sustained the business-when it is no longer profitable. Clearly, if
the right of workers to their jobs is to be protected, some restrictions on
such investment decisions are needed.
Where feasible, however, this approach could be an important
complement to legislation such as the National Employment Priorities
Act. There are several possible variations of this approach, which could
be applied individually or in various combinations."6 One variation
would involve additional legislation requiring a corporation that has de-
cided to close a plant to sell the plant to the workers or worker-commu-
nity coalition if they choose to buy it, and providing for feasibility stud-
ies and grants or no-interest loans in cases where a feasible plan exists.
16. These variations are set forth in DeCalvalho, et aL, 1981, § VI.
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Another variation would be nationalization. While this has been fairly
common in other countries, in the United States government financial
support, while increasingly accepted, has generally allowed for the con-
tinuation of prior corporate management. Under this proposal, the
workers or worker-community coalition would manage the plant.
A third variation would be an expanded use of the eminent domain
doctrine, whereby a city could condemn a property and take it over for
the public good, including specifically to insure job opportunities. Ac-
cording to the doctrine of eminent domain, the former owners must be
compensated, but the proper value may be determined by a jury of
community residents.
A fourth variation is where workers facing a shutdown seize a
plant and continue operating it on their own-either permanently or
until some other way is found to keep it open. This variation might well
be a necessary step, in practice, toward getting any legal recognition of
workers' rights to their jobs. Historically, workers have had to exercise
their rights independently of, and frequently in defiance of, the law in
order to gain legal recognition and protection of those rights. As we
shall see in the next chapter, this was true of both the right to organize
and the right to strike-and many government employees must still
defy the law to exercise their right to strike.
These approaches to protection of a property right of workers in
their jobs, though only partial, would be an important step toward es-
tablishing recognition of such a right, and recognition of a correspond-
ing limitation on the right of a corporation to make investment deci-
sions without regard for their impact on the lives of workers, their
families and communities.
But there are several reasons why I want to say that the right to a
job is more than a property right. Or, to put it another way, in addition
to the property right of a particular worker in a particular job, there is
a more general right of a person to a job. One reason I want to say this
is that the property right in a job does not apply to a person who is
unable to get a job in the first place. But I believe that person has a
right to a job.
Also, it seems plausible that the property right in one's job is
vested, so to speak, over time-becoming stronger the longer one works
at the job. This idea appears to be reflected in the standard union con-
tract provision that distribution of layoffs be by inverse seniority, and
in severance pay scales that are pegged to both rate of pay and number
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of years on the job.17 This seems appropriate when weighing the claims
of particular workers to particular jobs. But the worker with low se-
niority who keeps getting bumped off one job after another may put in
many years of work without ever acquiring a strong property right of
this sort in any job. Like the worker unable to get a job in the first
place, the right of this worker to a job is not adequately represented as
a property right in a particular job.
Moreover, it is, I think, commonly believed that if a property right
is (legitimately) overridden, that right is adequately recognized, and its
holder adequately compensated, if the full monetary value of the prop-
erty is paid him or her. If this is correct, then if a (legitimate) plant
shutdown results in a given worker becoming permanently unemployed
(because unable to get another job) his or her property right in the lost
job would be fully compensated if the appropriate proportion of pro-
jected earnings (up to 100 percent with sufficient years on the job)
were replaced. This might be done by some combination of unemploy-
ment insurance, severance pay and early pension, adjusted over time to
reflect as far as possible cost of living and wage increases that would
have been received on the job.
There are at least two ways in which this wage replacement would
not satisfy the worker's right to a job, even though it may well sat-
isfy-or compensate for-the property right in the lost job. First, if the
worker had been on the job only a short time, his or her property right
(assuming that it is vested over time) would not amount to much. And
if he or she is unable to find another job, this small amount does not
compensate hiln or her for the opportunity to earn a living that the lost
job represented. But if that amount is supplemented, say by welfare
payments (justified by subsistence rights rather than job rights), so that
the person has an adequate living, would there be any reason to say
that his or her rights were not fully satisfied? I think there would, and
this is the second way in which wage replacement would not satisfy the
right to a job. Even a worker who receives 100 percent of projected
income based on his or her property right in the lost job has a right to a
17. There are, of course, consequentialist considerations in favor of these prac-
tices, too, and these may be part of what gives rise to the property right and gives it
this particular shape. A worker who has worked at a job for many years is likely to be
older and have more difficulty finding another comparable job. One who has worked at
a job for several years is likely to be settled and have heavy home and family responsi-
bilities. But if these considerations were directly responsible for the practices men-
tioned, age and family responsibilities rather than seniority would be the appropriate
pegs.
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job, a right which is not satisfied by wage replacement. Persons have a
right to subsistence even if they cannot make a positive contribution to
society. But they also have a right to make a positive contribution if
they can.18 The sense that one is making a contribution is a necessary
condition of self-respect.
People need to feel that they are useful, productive members of
society. This is not only a necessary condition of self-esteem and self-
respect, but of mental and physical health generally. 19 Thomas Cottle,
a sociologist and psychologist at Harvard Medical School, has studied
the emotional impact of unemployment for fifteen years. He calls un-
employment "a killer disease." "In our culture, working is close to the
center of life. Our culture teaches that if you don't work in an accept-
able way, then you're supposed to be depressed. And when job loss
lasts. . .a million symptoms show-tooth decay, kidney failure, alco-
holism, sexual infertility." Moreover, he says, the unemployed suffering
mental health problems often do not seek help. "A lot of people want to
go for help, but they don't want to bear the extra burden of feeling that
along with being out of work, they're also crazy."20
Research by Dr. Henry Brenner of Johns Hopkins University for
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress showed that every long-
term one percent increase in unemployment means: a 4.1 percent in-
crease in suicides; a 3.4 percent increase in admissions to state mental
hospitals; a 5.7 percent increase in homicides; a 4 percent increase in
admissions to state prisons; and a 1.9 percent increase in deaths from
cirrhosis of the liver resulting from alcoholism (Brenner, 1976, V). A
recent study of workers affected by a plant shutdown revealed a suicide
rate thirty times that of the general population (Cobb and Kasl, 1977).
18. The Swedish approach to job loss places highest priority on finding the af-
fected worker another job, rejecting the notion that early retirement, even with full
pension, is an adequate substitute for a job. This shows a commitment to the idea that
persons have a right to make a productive contribution to society. As a result, unem-
ployment in Sweden is just over 2 percent (Economic Dislocation, 10, 12, 15). Even
this is too high.
19. As I am using the terms, "self-esteem" and "self-respect," these attitudes
toward oneself are distinct but related. To esteem someone is to hold that person in
high regard, to have a favorable opinion of him or her. To respect someone is to ac-
knowledge his or her dignity as a human being. According to the standard view, all
persons are owed respect, even if one holds some of them in low esteem. I suspect that
it is psychologically impossible fully to respect someone whom one holds in very low
esteem. In any case, I am sure that very low self-esteem undermines self-respect.
20. Quoted in an Associated Press article by Jane See White, the Home News,
New Brunswick, NJ, October 4, 1980.
[Vol. 8
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss3/5
Burnside Foundry
Other studies have shown that unemployment is not only a source
of psychological stress in itself, but also a cause of other stresses, such
as having to move, becoming separated or divorced, all of which are
correlated with higher rates of mental illness. Losing a job can set in
motion a vicious cycle of other personal catastrophes that are much
more difficult to handle for people who lack both the material and the
emotional resources that a decent, stable job provides. Increased infant
mortality and increased child abuse have also been linked to
unemployment.21
It is, of course, likely that these effects would be ameliorated
somewhat if loss of income did not accompany loss of one's job. But
income, or other means of providing for subsistence (even at a fairly
high level of material well-being) would not satisfy the need for a sense
of oneself as a productive, contributing member of society. For most
people in our society, that sense is inextricably tied to holding a job.22
That is what it means to most of us to "pull our own weight." And it is
this sense of oneself as a productive, contributing member of society
that I claim is necessary for self-respect, self-esteem, and mental and
physical health generally.
It may be objected that people do not have a right to self-respect
or self-esteem, or to mental and physical health generally. So how can
the fact that a job is a necessary condition for these lead to a right to a
job?
We do not have rights to these things because, important as they
are, they are not things that other people, or society as a whole, can
provide or guarantee. But society can provide or guarantee some of the
necessary conditions for them, such as adequate shelter and nutrition, a
safe and healthy home and work environment, access to adequate
health care (both preventive and interventionist), educational and other
opportunities to develop knowledge and skills and undertake challeng-
ing tasks. To these, I claim, we do have rights. And, in our society at
least, the right to a job is one of these rights.
These same considerations, moreover, lead to the conclusion that
the right to a job must be understood, not as the right to just some job
21. Annual report of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity,
1979, excerpted in the America Federationist, October 1979.
22. This need not be so in all societies. There could be and there have been
societies where there is nothing like a job, as we know them, to be had. Persons would,
I suppose, still have the need for a sense of themselves as productive, contributing
members, but it would take different forms in different kinds of society.
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or other, however pointless, demeaning, and unchallenging, but the
right to a job involving useful and challenging work.
In a paper discussing several studies of the mental health of work-
ers in various kinds of jobs, psychologist Charles Hampden-Turner
says:
Perhaps the most detailed and perceptive study ever made of
the condition of American workers was that of Arthur Kornhauser
(1964) who studied Detroit automobile plants along with other
smaller factories in the area. He used a measuring index of
"Mental Health." Those with "Low" Mental Health typically suf-
fered at least two psychosomatic symptoms. They had low self-es-
teem, periodic feelings of depression, poor social relationships, un-
controllable anxiety reactions, strong hostilities, chronic distrust,
and poor life satisfaction. The absence of such symptoms, plus a
positive feeling of self-worth and strong friendships, constituted
"High" Mental Health [Hampden-Turner, 1973, 33].
Only 34 percent of workers in large factories had high mental health
(compared to 51 percent in small factories, 69 percent in nonfactory
and 76 percent in white collar jobs). Moreover, the 34 percent with
high mental health were mostly skilled workers, all with more than six
years of steady employment and relatively secure seniority rights. The
percentage of workers with high mental health correlated with job skill
levels as follows: Skilled 58 percent; Semiskilled 35 percent; Repetitive
semiskilled 10 percent; Repetitive, machine-paced, semi-skilled 7 per-
cent. Only those with very similar pre-job characteristics were used in
making this comparison, so these differences cannot be attributed to
social background or education.
Hampden-Turner also reports the conclusion of a paper reviewing
seven studies of worker satisfaction and dissatisfaction: "Karsh con-
cluded that satisfaction is bound up with the degree to which the
worker can exercise his own judgment on his job and the extent to
which he can control the conditions affecting his work" (Hampden-
Turner, 1973, 39).
A special task force appointed in 1971 by the then Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, said in its report:
We have sufficient evidence about the relationship between
work and heart disease, longevity, mental illness and other health
problems to warrant governmental action. That jobs can be made
more satisfying and that this will lead to healthier and more pro-
ductive workers and citizens is no longer in doubt. [Work in
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America, 1973, 114]
In a paper entitled "Meaningful Work" (1982), philosopher Adina
Schwartz argues that commitment to an ideal of autonomy for all per-,
sons leads to the claim that no one should be employed in routine, re-
petitive jobs in which workers decide neither the overall goals of the
enterprise nor how to perform their own jobs. She says that an individ-
ual achieves autonomy "to the extent that he/she rationally forms and
acts on some overall conception of what he/she wants in life," and she
argues that the empirical literature strongly supports the claim that
autonomy, so understood, is undermined by such jobs. To achieve au-
tonomy, people need to have opportunities to frame their own goals and
decide how best to pursue them. Not having such opportunities at work
undermines people's motivation and ability to be autonomous in the
rest of their lives. She quotes Arthur Kornhauser in support of this
claim:
Factory employment, especially in routine production tasks,
does give evidence of extinguishing workers' ambition, initiative,
and purposeful direction towards life goals. . . .[Kornhauser;
1965, 252]
The unsatisfactory mental health of working people consists in no
small measure of their dwarfed desires and deadened initiative, re-
duction of their goals and restriction of their efforts to a point
where life is relatively empty and only half meaningful. [Korn-
hauser, 1965, 270]
It is, I think, significant that the same conclusion emerges from a
commitment to the idea of autonomy on the one hand, and from the
more mundane-sounding commitment to guaranteeing, as far as possi-
ble, the necessary conditions for mental and physical health on the
other. Schwarz's conception of autonomy includes, and goes beyond,
self-determination, as I have been using the latter idea. As we have
seen in this discussion and in earlier chapters, the right of self-determi-
nation both supports and is supported by health and safety rights. If, in
addition, we are, or should be, committed to promoting autonomy, then
we have another argument for the self-determination of workers in
their work. It may not be an independent argument, however, for I
suspect that something like Schwartz's conception will turn out to be
the only plausible and coherent account of autonomy, and I futher sus-
pect that autonomy, so understood, is an important, perhaps the most
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important, aspect of mental health.
To sum up this part of the discussion, there are several ways in
which health and safety rights and the right to a job are connected.
The right to a safe job is empty if the cost of refusing an unsafe assign-
ment is one's job. It is also empty if the cost of strong legal and/or
contractual health and safety provisions is a shutdown or runaway
shop. The right to a job arises as a necessary condition for self-respect,
self-esteem, and mental and physical health generally. The right to a
useful and challenging job arises both as a necessary condition for
mental and physical health and from the right to a safe and healthy
job. Finally, a commitment to promoting autonomy also provides sup-
port for the right to useful and challenging work.
An exploration of the implications of the right to useful work
would involve us in assessing what gets produced in our society and
why. (Why are steelworkers and autoworkers, out of work as a result of
plant closings or cutbacks, not employed in production to meet urgent
human and social needs such as mass transit? Why are construction
workers out of work when there is an urgent need for housing-both
the renovation of existing stock and the building of new?) Exploring
the right to challenging work would require us to look at how the work
that is done is carried out, as we have begun to do here.
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